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JULIUS G. GETMAN
THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF SEXUAL EQUALITY
I. THE COURT CHANGES POSITION
Sexual equality, a matter for joking only a few years ago,
seems today on the verge of being incorporated into the Constitu-
tion as a basic right. Courts, once committed to the doctrine that
the sexes are inherently unequal, seem now eager to recant. The
Supreme Court too has revised its former approach to sex discrimi-
nation, although without apparent enthusiasm and without formal
announcement of a change of policy.
In Reed v. Reed,' the Court invalidated an Idaho statute which
gave a preference to the man whenever two persons, a man and a
woman equally entitled by degree of relationship to the deceased,
filed letters seeking appointment as administrator of an estate. In
Stanley v. Illinois,2 the Court held that denial to an unwed father
of a hearing on his fitness before removing a child from his custody
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violated the Equal Protection Clause when unwed mothers in simi-
lar circumstances were entitled to a hearing.
Neither in Reed nor in Stanley did the Court repudiate its earlier
decisions which had uniformly recognized the constitutionality of
government action that differentiated between the sexes. Perhaps
the most significant authority in support of sex discrimination was
Muller v. Oregon,3 in which the Court affirmed the right of the
Oregon legislature to set minimum hours for women even though
similar legislation regulating men's hours was earlier held unconsti-
tutional. The opinion was heavily influenced by the famous brief
filed by Louis D. Brandeis which sought to demonstrate that wom-
en, because of physiological differences, were less capable of physi-
cal labor and were in greater need of protection against burdensome
job requirements than men. The Muller case established the legiti-
macy of state efforts "to afford special protection to women." In
subsequent cases the Court showed considerable ingenuity in ascrib-
ing to the state legitimate or protective reasons for sex discrimination.
The brief for the appellant in Reed strongly urged the Court
either to declare sex a suspect classification or otherwise to elabo-
rate on the approach it would take in future cases.4 The Court de-
clined to do so. It justified its decision on the traditional grounds
that the sex of the competing applicants did not bear "a rational
relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by
the operation" of the statutes in question.' The Court did not stress
the importance of sexual equality as a constitutional goal. It also
failed to explain why the legislative weighing of interests was
improper. 6
Despite the cautious nature of the opinions and the lack of elabo-
3 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
4 Appellant was represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Pauli Murray, Dorothy
Kenyon, Melvin L. Wulf, and Allen R. Deer. Thirty-nine pages of argument were de-
voted to urging the Court to declare sex a suspect classification. This section of the brief
contained an excellent summary of the various ways in which the law has traditionally
discriminated against women. Only six pages were devoted to arguing that the classifica-
tion did not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.
1404 U.S. at 76.
6 The decision by the Idaho court did not discuss possible reasons for choosing men
over women in such cases. 93 Idaho 511 (1970). The Stanley case was argued in terms
of rationality of the state's differentiating between unwed fathers and other parents.
The Court simply announced that "denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him
while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection
Clause." 405 U.S. at 658.
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radon on the limits of sexual classification, the decisions in Reed
and Stanley mark a significant change in the Court's approach to
sex discrimination.
1. The Court in Reed did not attempt to supply a rationale to
justify the sexual discrimination. In earlier cases the Supreme Court
either did so or simply assumed legislative competence to determine
areas unsuitable for women. Thus, in Goesaert v. Cleary, the Court
upheld a statute forbidding women from being licensed as bar-
tenders. Even though women were permitted to serve as waitresses
in places in which liquor was served, the Court concluded that the
legislation was aimed at reducing moral and social problems which
might result from women working as bartenders.8 Had the Court
in Reed utilized a similar approach, it might have justified the statute
on the grounds that men are more experienced at managing financial
affairs than women; or the statute's provision preferring men might
have been treated as equivalent to the legislature choosing among
classes of relatives.
2. The Court stated in Reed and indicated in Stanley that the
administrative gains involved in eliminating a hearing could not be
accomplished at the cost of giving one sex preference over the other.
The Idaho Supreme Court had upheld the statute on the grounds
that it was a legitimate way to eliminate the administrative burden
which would be placed on the probate court if hearings were re-
quired in such cases. The Supreme Court, in rejecting this justifi-
cation, stated: 9
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate
courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some
legitimacy. The crucial question, however, is whether § 15-314
advances that objective in a manner consistent with the com-
mand of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not.
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The priority given to the rule of sexual equality over ease of
administrative convenience is in marked contrast with earlier cases.
7 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
' The appellant contended that the motive was preserving jobs for male bartenders.
The Court refused to "give ear to the suggestion" that such an "unchivalrous desire" was
the real purpose. Id. at 467.
9 404 U.S. at 76.
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In Hoyt v. Florida° the Court upheld a system of jury selection by
which women were excluded from the rolls unless they specifically
asked to serve while men were relieved only if they claimed a spe-
cific exemption. The Court rejected the argument that it was im-
proper for the state to assume without a hearing that all women had
competing responsibilities which made jury service a hardship:"
We "cannot regard it as irrational for a state legislature to [assume]
that it would not be administratively feasible to decide in each indi-
vidual instance whether family responsibilities of a prospective
female juror were serious enough to warrant an exemption." And
in the cases in which it upheld the exclusion of women from certain
occupations or limited their hours of work, the Court did not sug-
gest a hearing to determine whether individual women were in fact
capable of doing the prohibited work or working longer hours.' 2
3. Perhaps most significantly, the Court in both Reed and Stan-
ley rejected the contention that the sex discrimination involved
could be justified by the state's interest in regulating family rela-
tionships. The Court in Reed stated that "whatever the state's inter-
est in 'avoiding intrafamily controversy,' it could not achieve this
end by differentiating 'solely on the basis of sex.' "13 The Court in
Stanley rejected the argument that differentiating between unwed
fathers and other parents was a part of "a comprehensive legislative
plan which affects all children in need of protection from abuse,
neglect or abandonment."' 4
The regulation of family relationships has traditionally been rec-
ognized as a significant state interest justifying differentiation be-
tween classes of persons. Thus, in Labine v. Vincent'5 it was held
that the state could deny inheritance rights to illegitimate children
as an incident of its "power to make rules, to establish, protect, and
strengthen family life."' 6 The cases which have permitted the state
to exclude women from full participation in our society have ulti-
10 368 U.S. 57 (1961). "Id. at 63.
12 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 422; Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
13 404 U.S. at 77.
14 See Brief for the State at p. 11. The decision in Stanley is less significant than that
in Reed. Four Justices joined the majority opinion in Stanley, two dissented, and Douglas,
J., concurred separately.
'1401 U.S. 532 (1971). 1d. at 538.
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mately rested on this basis. In Bradwell v. State,"17 Justice Bradley,
concurring, explained that the state could exclude women from the
practice of law on the grounds that "it is within the province of the
legislature to ordain what offices, positions and callings shall be filled
and discharged by men" in order to preserve "the family organiza-
tion, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things."' As recently as 1961 the Court justified the auto-
matic exemption from jury service for women using similar reason-
ing if somewhat less florid language: 19
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the re-
strictions and protections of bygone years and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be re-
served to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally im-
permissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare,
to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic
duty of jury service unless she herself determines that such
service is consistent with her own special responsibilities.
The Court in Reed did not hold that the regulation of family re-
lations may never justify treating the sexes differently. Nevertheless,
the summary rejection of this traditional basis for sexual discrimi-
nation in a case where the interest being vindicated was not very
significant suggests that the Court has fundamentally altered the
balance between sexual equality and state regulation of family re-
lations. The Stanley case is further indication of the Court's shift.
Not only did the majority reject the argument that the state could
distinguish between unwed mothers and fathers to protect the wel-
fare of illegitimate children, but perhaps for the first time in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, it was unwilling to indulge the presumption of
the unique nature of mother's love. This assumption was repeatedly
invoked in the brief for the state. It was accepted by Chief Justice
Burger, who was prepared to uphold the state system on the grounds
that it merely reflected an observable difference between the sexes:
20
17 16 Vall. 130 (1872). See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894). Both were
overruled, sub silentio. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
11 16 Wall. at 142, 141. '9 368 U.S. at 61-62.
20 405 U.S. at 665-66. It is curious that the Chief Justice who wrote the Court's
opinion in Reed dissented in Stanley. He was prepared to accept the constitutionality of
Illinois's conclusion that women make better parents (at least when the parents are
unwed) but was not willing to accept the constitutional validity of Idaho's assumption
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I believe that a state is fully justified in concluding, on the
basis of common human experience, that the biological role of
the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger
bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from
the male's often casual encounter. This view is reinforced by
the observable fact that most unwed mothers exhibit a concern
for their offspring either permanently or at least until they are
safely placed for adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden
either the mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties.
Centuries of human experience buttress this view of the reali-
ties of human conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of
illegitimate children are generally more dependable protectors
of their children than are unwed fathers.
The decisions in Reed and Stanley demonstrate that the Court
can significantly alter the constitutional importance of sexual equal-
ity without formally changing the standard of review under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The traditional tests under the Fourteenth
Amendment have always left considerable discretion to the Court
through the technique of defining the statute's purpose. If the pur-
pose is described narrowly in terms of the immediate ends which
a statute seeks to achieve, then distinctions which serve peripheral
or secondary goals may be held improper. Thus, the statute in Reed
was described as a way to resolve disputes about administration.
Differentiation between the sexes was neither necessary nor directly
related to the purpose. It also could have been characterized as
seeking to resolve disputes without disturbing interfamily harmony.
While the Reed opinion does not suggest what type of justifica-
tion would be adequate to support sexual discrimination, it together
with Stanley suggests that the factors to be considered are the im-
portance of the state interest being served by the discrimination and
the possibility of achieving the objective by other means. These are
the same factors which would be considered were the Court to an-
nounce that sex is a suspect classification. Recent cases suggest a
general policy of stricter judicial scrutiny of state classifications in
equal protection cases. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co.,2 Mr. Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that the balance to be
struck in determining how closely to examine state action is, "What
that men are better or more desirable administrators. His seemingly contradictory opin-
ions would indicate that the state's power to distinguish between the sexes is inevitably
affected by whether the Justices think particular distinctions reflect actual differences
between men and women.
2'1406 U.S. 164 (1972).
[1972
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legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fun-
damental personal rights might the classification endanger? '2 2 Fol-
lowing this approach the Court invalidated Louisiana's workmen's
compensation law which denied equal recovery to illegitimate and
legitimate children. The Court recognized the state interest in regu-
lating family relationships but closely examined how that regulation
was to be accomplished. The Court required a "significant relation-
ship" between the purpose and the means. The dissent called this
standard a hybrid of the rational relationship and strict scrutiny
standards. 23
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,24 the Court used the same formulation that
it used in Reed to invalidate a Massachusetts law making it a felony
to distribute contraceptives. Not only was the Court unwilling to
supply the necessary justification, it rejected the purposes proposed
by the state (protection of health, public morals, and family rela-
tionships) as too broad or too attenuated. The Court was clearly
looking for more than a possible rational basis to justify state action,
though not stating that it was using anything stricter. It is not clear,
however, that this general trend will continue because there is a
dispute within the Court about the extent to which the Equal Pro-
tection Clause should be used to review the reasonableness of legis-
lation. Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Burger all dissented in
one or more of the cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate state legislation.25
The change in the standard of review in Reed and Stanley was
made so indirectly, however, that the Reed opinion has given rise
to conflicting interpretations in the lower courts.26 This conflict
and the increase in the amount of litigation concerning women
22 Id. at 173. 23 Id. at 181. 24405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
2 6Thus, in Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 4 FEP CASES 353 (CA 5th,
1972), in upholding a policy of forced maternity leave, the court cited Reed for the propo-
sition that "in applying the Equal Protection Clause the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways. The clause does prohibit the States from
placing people in different classes 'on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objec-
tive of the statute.' " Id. at 359. On the other hand, in LaFleur v. Board of Education,
4 FEP CASES 1070 (CA 6th, 1972), the court in rejecting a forced maternity leave pro-
gram cited Reed for the proposition "there is a marked trend of cases to invalidate regula-
tions based on sex classification unless supported by a valid state interest." Id. at 1073.
In Green v. Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249 (1971), the court stated, "The Supreme
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make it inevitable that the Court will have an opportunity to recon-
sider the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to sex discrimi-
nation. The general political and social commitment to equal rights
for women is too great to retreat from Reed and Stanley and return
to the Court's casual acceptance of the state's ability to "draw sharp
lines" between the sexes. The inclusion of sex discrimination in
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has made a significant impact
on employment practices and concepts. It has in recent years been
vigorously pursued by the EEOC and has led to similar provisions
in many state laws.28 A variety of administrative and legal tech-
niques have recently been developed for the purpose of eliminating
sex discrimination.2 9 The Equal Rights Amendment has passed both
houses of Congress, and the platforms of both major parties contain
pledges to achieve legal equality between the sexes. Thus, distinc-
tion based on the concept of separate spheres has become much less
consistent with the general fabric of our legal system.30 It seems
Court of the United States has recently made it quite clear that discrimination ... on
the basis of sex is not to be tolerated." Id. at 250.
2 7 Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972),
does not mark a retreat from the Supreme Court's position in Reed and Stanley. In Forbush,
the lower court held that Alabama's common law requiring women to assume their
husband's surname on marrying does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The lower
court opinion was based in part, however, on the fact that no real injury was involved
because it was easy for the woman to change her name. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
affirmance of a case such as this one on its appellate docket, without hearing or opinion
as here, is considered equivalent to a mere denial of certiorari. See Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal.3d 584, 615-18, and especially note 34 (1971).
28 Forty states currently ban sex discrimination in employment.
29 See, in general, Developments in the La'w-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1166-94, 1242-1303 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as Developments-Title VII); BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND
THE LAw 408-16 (1971). An area ripe for testing is the state action implication in tax
benefits to private schools and associations that discriminate in admissions. Tax-exempt
status may not be granted, and tax-deductible contributions may not be made to schools
or other associations that discriminate on racial grounds. Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wisc. 1971). See recent action of NLRB General Counsel on
the unions' duty of fair representation in sex discrimination. 80 BNA LABOR REPORTER
65 (1972).
30 This is not to say that the concept of sexual equality has been generally accepted. It
is still widely assumed that certain types of work are for one sex or the other, that men's
and women's personalities are unalterably different, and that certain types of behavior
which are suitable for men or boys are unsuitable for women or girls. See Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
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likely that Reed and Stanley are the forerunners of a policy of strict
review in cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex.
The change in policy should be made explicit. The simplest
method for declaring legal equality between the sexes to be an im-
portant constitutional principle is to hold that sex is a suspect classi-
fication under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a declaration
would acknowledge that sexual classification has historically been
used as a technique for depriving women of opportunities available
to men. It would also be implicit acceptance of the analogy between
sexual and racial discrimination which has been urged so forcefully
by proponents of women's rights.31
Despite the historic significance involved in these determina-
tions, the precise ways in which existing law would be changed are
unclear. Under the suspect classification analysis, it is still necessary
in particular cases to determine whether a compelling state interest
justifies the use of sexual classification. The Court would have to
consider the extent to which the classification is based on what it
considers to be legitimate differences between the sexes, the impor-
tance of the state interest being served, and whether the goal could
be achieved in ways which do not involve sexual classification. The
doctrine of suspect classification does not supply answers in particu-
lar cases to the questions raised by these considerations.32 Announce-
ment that sex is to be treated as a suspect classification would be
understood as rejecting traditional justifications for sex discrimina-
tion and as notice that the national commitment to sexual equality
will be given great weight in future cases. The interest in achieving
sexual equality, however, does not always militate against the use of
sexual classification. Indeed, in certain cases the promotion of sexual
equality may be the compelling state interest which permits the use
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YAI.E LJ. 871, 882 nn.29, 30 (1971). What has been ac-
cepted, however, is the principle that the law should not be used to prevent women from
full participation in national life.
3 1 See, e.g., Murray, The Negro Woman's Stake in the Equal Rights Amendment,
6 HARV. Civ. RTs.-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 253, 257 (1971); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 95 Cal.
Rep. 329 (1971).
32 Indeed, had the suspect classification formulation been used when such cases as
Muller v. Oregon, and Goesaert v. Cleary, were considered, they might well have been
decided the same way. Muller, which involved the constitutionality of legislation regu-
lating hours of work for women, could have been justified by the compelling state interest
in protecting women from the perils of overwork, and Goesaert by the state's interest in
regulating the sale of liquor to prevent social harm to women.
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of sexual classification. The Court must still address itself to the
difficult question of elaborating the legal implications of sexual
equality and of weighing the importance of various types of justi-
fication for sexual classification.
The application of the suspect classification doctrine to sex may
be made unnecessary by passage of the Equal Rights Amendment,
which provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex." The Amendment also authorizes the Congress and the states
to enforce the Amendment by appropriate enforcement legislation.
Although it has been suggested that the Equal Rights Amendment
would prohibit almost any classification based on sex, this is not
necessarily so. Indeed, it can be read as specifically authorizing such
sexual classification for the purpose of promoting equality. Thus,
under the Equal Rights Amendment, as under the doctrine of sus-
pect classification, the Court will have to decide the extent to which
programs employing sexual classifications are consistent with the
elusive concept of sexual equality. In the rest of this paper I will
discuss the interests which the Court should consider in answering
questions likely to arise after passage of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment or application of the suspect classification doctrine to sex. The
discussion is focused primarily in the area of education.
II. AFFIRMATIvE ACTION PROGRAMS
Fair employment practices laws, including Title VII, were
originally aimed at preventing conscious discrimination by provid-
ing remedies in specific cases.33 This approach, however, did not
make a significant impact on hiring or promotional practices. Em-
ployers changed avowedly discriminatory policies without substan-
tially changing the composition of their work force. Standards fre-
quently used and seemingly objective turned out to have discrimina-
tory impact.3 4 It has proved difficult to establish whether neutral
33See generally Developments-Title VII, 1113-19, 1123-26; Blumrosen, The Duty
of Fair Recruitment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465, 465-66,
509-27 (1968); H.R. Rep. No. 570, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). See also SOVERN,
LEGAL REsTRAiNTs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
a" Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker. Reflections on
Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1039 (1969).
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standards are in fact being applied in a discriminatory fashion.
Techniques for evasion are many. Nondiscriminatory policies
which may have been adopted in good faith can be subverted by
those taking part in the hiring process.35 Only a small fraction of
violations were ever called to the attention of the agencies, and even
then the process was slow and the result uncertain. The EEOC and
the courts responded by permitting the use of racial statistics as a
way of establishing a violation of the Act and of treating cases as
class actions.30 It became possible to prove discrimination by show-
ing that the existing work force did not contain qualified women
or blacks and that existing recruitment and promotion techniques
were not serving to redress the balance.
Affirmative action programs began as a way of overcoming the
limitations involved in case-by-case adjudication. They began as vol-
untary programs with little or no enforcement machinery. Govern-
ment contractors simply pledged themselves to seek out qualified mi-
nority group members. The Philadelphia Plan combined the concept
of affirmative action with the use of racial statistics. The program,
adopted by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in the Phila-
delphia area, required construction contractors to establish a pro-
gram which recruited qualified minority group workers in order to
obtain or continue working under a government contract.3 7 The
Department of Labor announced the percentage of minority group
employees which it expected would be hired by a specified date if
nondiscriminatory hiring policies were used. While the plan also
provided that no qualified worker was to be denied a job because of
race, failure to hire the proscribed percentage was deemed a prima
facie evidence of discriminatory hiring, which could lead to loss
of contracts unless adequately explained. The plan was hailed by
some because it promised resultsY.s It was attacked by others as in-
volving the use of quotas and therefore illegal.3 9 Its legality was,
however, upheld in the Court of Appeals on the grounds that it did
'5 Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970); see also Brown et al., note 30
supra, at 899, n.51, for cases and sources.
"G Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment La'ws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235 (1971).
37 Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wisc. L. REv. 341; for revised
guidelines, see 401 F.E.P. 25, 255, 262 (1972).
"
3Jones, note 37 supra, at 347, 364-73, 398-403.
" The Comptroller General took this position. Id. at 358-61, 394-98.
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not involve a fixed hiring quota.40 Similar plans have since been
adopted in other areas.
The widespread use of affirmative action programs in higher
education developed after a finding by HEW (which had responsi-
bility for eliminating discrimination by government contractors in
education) that the University of Michigan had been guilty of sex
discrimination. The university was threatened with loss of govern-
ment contracts. Since such contracts are now crucial to the eco-
nomic well-being of colleges and universities, and since the Michi-
gan hiring policies did not seem very different from those employed
by most other major institutions, the finding created serious con-
cern among academic administrators throughout the country. Un-
der pressure from HEW, which has since established guidelines for
affirmative action programs,41 and from women's groups, many uni-
versities have now adopted affirmative action programs dealing with
the recruitment and hiring and promotion of women. Although
there are considerable variations among the programs, generally
they involve the commitment to an effort to recruit or hire a stated
percentage of women and to equalize salaries of men and women.
All these programs require that those making significant decisions
consider the sex of those receiving benefits.
There has been very little discussion of the constitutionality of
benign quotas and compensatory programs for women under either
the Equal Rights Amendment or the suspect classification doctrine.
The landmark article interpreting the Equal Rights Amendment by
Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman takes the position that under
the Fourteenth Amendment, such programs could be justified by
"Ccompelling [state] reasons," but that under the Equal Rights
Amendment, "the guarantee of equal rights for women may not be
qualified in the manner that 'suspect classification' or 'fundamental
interest' doctrines allow." 42
40 Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159 (CA 3d, 1971).
41 29 C.F.R. § 1604, Guidelines; Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Women's
Work Has Just Begun: Legal Problems of Employing Women in Universities, Ann Arbor
(1972).
12 Brown et al., note 30 supra, at 904. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Majority
Report on the Equal Rights Amendment, 14 March 1972, stated that although that
Amendment would not permit separate-but-equal schools, it would also "not require
quotas for men and women, nor would it require that schools accurately reflect the sex
distribution in the population." P. 17.
PRINCIPLE OF SEXUAL EQUALITY 169
The compelling reason used to justify affirmative action pro-
grams is that they promote sexual equality. A similar justification
has been implicitly accepted in some cases of affirmative action
aimed at eliminating racial disparities.4 3 As noted above, however,
this argument can be made with equal force under the Equal Rights
Amendment. The purpose of the Equal Rights Amendment is to
remove barriers preventing women from full participation in na-
tional life. Affirmative action programs are consistent with this goal.
On the other hand, affirmative action programs may be challenged
under either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Equal Rights
Amendment on the ground that they involve singling out women
for favored treatment. It has been argued that any system which
grants benefits on the basis of group affiliation is inconsistent with
the principle of evaluation based on individual merit, traditionally
considered to be central to the concept of equal treatment. 44
Judicial authority and public sentiment are both profoundly di-
vided on the question whether equality permits recognition of
group affiliation. It is unnecessary for the Court in resolving this
question to reject either the principle of individual merit or the
concept of compensatory affirmative action. Affirmative action pro-
" Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 192 (1964). The New York Court of Appeals approved
a school board plan to rezone a junior high school. In addition to the usual factors, the
board considered improving racial balance in drawing the boundaries. The plan was
challenged under a law that said that a child could not be denied admittance to a school
on the basis of race. The court approved the plan on the basis that these laws were in-
tended to protect blacks and other minority groups. See also Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965).
" See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Seabury, HEW and the Universities,
53 COMMENTARY 38 (1972).
4 See Quotas: The Sleeper Issue of 1972, NEWSWEEK 36-37 (18 September, 1972). In
DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727, Wash. King County Super. Ct. (Washington; Sept.
22, 1971), the court ordered the admission to law school of the plaintiff because his
academic credentials seemed superior to minority applicants who were admitted. In
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (CA 8th, 1971), the court upheld a plan for remedying
past discrimination, which required that one out of every three hired must be a minority
group member until twenty were hired.
The Democratic party at its 1972 national convention insisted that each delegation
contain minimum percentages of women and minority group members. The Republicans
specifically rejected such an approach and insisted that a system of quotas is discrimina-
tory and, in fact, contrary to the basic principle of individual merit. Good statements of
opposing considerations are to be found in the exchange of letters between Professors
Gould and Glazer in the New York Times on 2 March 1972, 11 April 1972, and 20
April 1972.
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grams differ in the extent to which they depart from a standard of
individual merit and in their potential for furthering equality. Each
should be evaluated separately considering several factors.
1. How likely is it that objective or nonbiased standards will be
used if the affirmative action program is invalidated? Much of the
criticism of compensatory hiring and promotional programs in uni-
versities is based on the assumption that the current system selects
the ablest teachers and scholars available and rewards them accord-
ing to merit without regard to race, religion, sex, or other extraneous
considerations. Thus, Professor Paul Seabury of the University of
California, a severe critic of affirmative action programs, recently
wrote in Commentary:46
Fifteen years ago, David Riesman in his Constraint and Va-
riety in American Education pointed to certain qualities which
distinctively characterized avant-garde institutions of higher
learning in this country. The world of scholarship, he said "is
democratic rather than aristocratic in tone, and scholars are
made, not born."... Paradoxically this democratization of the
university (with its stress not on status but upon excellence in
performance) had not begun in rank-and-file small colleges of
the nation, which were exemplars of America's ethnic, reli-
gious, and cultural diversity. Rather it had come out of those
innovating institutions which, in quest of excellence, either
abandoned or transcended much of their discriminatory socio-
logical parochialism.... The egalitarianism of excellence, a de-
mocracy of performance, was an ethos consummated by the
avant-garde.
... by the 1950's the great American universities attained an
authentic cosmopolitanism of scholarship matched by no other
university system in the world. And the outward reach of
American higher education toward the best the world of schol-
arship could offer generated an inward magnetism, attracting
to itself the most qualified students who could be found to
study with these newly renowned faculties.
This system of recruitment also left a myriad of American
sociological categories statistically underrepresented in the
highest precincts of American higher education. Today, with
respect to race and ethnicity, blacks, Irish, Italians, Greeks,
Poles, and all other Slavic groups (including Slovaks, Slovenes,
Serbs, Czechs, and Croatians) are underrepresented. On facul-
ties, at least, women are underrepresented. Important religious
categories are underrepresented.
46Seabury, note 44 supra, at 40.
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Despite Professor Seabury's eloquence, the picture which he
paints of university hiring and selection processes is unduly flatter-
ing. Subtle but real discrimination has traditionally been a part of
the process of faculty appointment even at leading universities. '
For example, the factor of personal recommendation, which is cru-
cial to the hiring process, has built into it an unconscious sex bias.
Certain students call themselves to the attention of their professors
as likely prospects for future teaching positions. They appear to be
seriously committed to scholarship and to possess the necessary
mental abilities. For the most part they are skillful at argument,
verbally aggressive, what we like to call tough-minded, and willing
to challenge the professor openly in class discussion. Whatever their
characteristics, women students are less likely than men to be seen
as serious scholars by their teachers. Moreover, verbal aggressive-
ness and tough-mindedness have been discouraged in young girls
and, when demonstrated by women, verbal aggressiveness and
tough-mindedness often seem less praiseworthy, even offensive.48
The same considerations will affect the impression which a
woman applicant makes in an interview. Many men unconsciously
desire or expect submissive behavior from women in a discussion.
Many women are accustomed to complying.49 If they do, they may
be thought to lack the toughness necessary for a good teacher or
scholar. If the expected behavior is not forthcoming, the man may
feel uncomfortable, possibly even threatened, and conclude that the
woman would not be a desirable colleague. 0
2. To what extent are the people benefited by the affirmative
action program likely to be the same ones disadvantaged by previ-
ous policies? E.g., a program to give special financial assistance or
47 The statistics are set forth and the dynamics pointed out in Murray, Economic and
Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 5 VALPo. L. REv. 237, 258-68 (1972);
Indiana University AAUP Committee on the Status of Women, Study of Women: Study
of the Status of Women Faculty at Indiana University, Bloomington Campus (1971).
48 Cavanagh, A Little Dearer Than His Horse: Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Person-
ality, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1971); Romer & Secor, The Time
Is Here For Women's Liberation, 397 ANNALS 129 (1971); Horner, Women's Will to Fail,
PsYcHOLOGY TODAY (November 1969).
49 Cavanagh, note 48 supra, at 274.
50 Even the evaluation of publications will in many disciplines contain an element of
sex bias. For an interesting description of the way sexual expectations may affect critical
reaction to published work, see Ozick, We Are the Crazy Lady and Other Feisty Feminist
Fables, Ms., p. 40 (Spring 1971).
hiring preference to older married women with children would have
a special claim to validity. In the recent past it was especially difficult
for married women to obtain a desirable teaching position or ad-
mission to a graduate school. Some admissions committees felt that
a professional education would be wasted on married women. It
was often assumed that job offers would be declined or that posi-
tions accepted would be given up eventually to serve family needs.
If a woman had children, all of these concerns were increased, and
maternity policies in many institutions were so framed as to create
severe conflict between motherhood and professional interests.
It is impossible to reconstruct the ways in which these policies
affected individual women because the impact was felt at so many
levels. Some women were denied education or employment because
of these policies. Some did not apply or even consider certain
careers because of their awareness of the policies or because of their
own acceptance of the underlying value judgment that a woman's
primary obligation was to her family."
3. Is the program in an area in which achieving equality will serve
significant social interests or in which existing inequalities have spe-
cial costs? The Supreme Court has noted that methods of selection
which keep women off juries deprive the deliberative process of
qualities which women bring to bear. The classic statement was
made by Mr. Justice Douglas in Ballard v. United States:12
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the
other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom
from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference.
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either is excluded.
Most institutions will function better if they can avail themselves
more fully of the diverse experiences of different groups.13 In addi-
tion, the inclusion of either sex in an area previously reserved to the
s Cavanagh, note 48 supra, at 272.
52 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946). The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), holding that a white man was deprived of due process of law
because blacks had been systematically excluded from the jury that convicted him.
"When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties
of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." Id. at 503.
51 MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE: A STUDY OF THE SEXES IN A CHANGING WORLD 357
(1968).
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other serves an educational function. When women assume posi-
tions formerly held by men, it educates women to the fact that a
wider range of choice is now available, and it causes men to re-
evaluate their conception of women. No easy method exists to iden-
tify those areas in which the benefits of inclusion are greatest. Some
of the applicable considerations can be recognized.
a) Equality is particularly important for institutions such as edu-
cation, the legal profession, and the arts which play a major role in
shaping the standards and goals of the society.
b) Equality is also necessary in those positions which involve
stating or effectuating public policy. This includes legislative, judi-
cial, and high-level administrative positions.
c) The availability of different models is most crucial in areas of
high prestige and in occupations which have traditionally been
thought of as requiring attributes associated with one sex or the
other. This would include the military and police, athletics, and
grade school teaching.
4. Does the program require rejecting qualified people on the
basis of sex? A requirement that the next person hired for a de-
partment must be a woman might mean that a highly qualified man
will not even be considered. Such an approach is much more incon-
sistent with the idea of judging individuals on their own merits than
a flexible program of percentages, which forces those in charge of
hiring to make special efforts to locate qualified women or minori-
ties. The latter is only marginally, if at all, inconsistent with the
concept of individual merit. Of course to be effective any program
requires an enforcement mechanism. Where flexible targets are in-
volved, however, those doing the selecting are given an opportunity
to demonstrate that failure to meet the target was not the result of
lack of sincere or reasonable effort.
5. Is there a significant existing imbalance in the work force or
student population? Such an imbalance would suggest past discrimi-
nation against women or that women have been discouraged from
entering the field. In such cases affirmative action programs may be
necessary to make known that opportunities do exist or that it is
acceptable for women to enter the field.
III. PREGNANCY
The policies which an institution adopts concerning preg-
nancy and childbirth will significantiy affect employment oppor-
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tunities for women. Neither the Equal Rights Amendment nor the
suspect classification doctrine provides the standards to be applied
in evaluating the validity of programs applicable to pregnancy.
Because pregnancy is unique to one sex, considerations of equality
are necessarily interwoven with questions concerning the reason-
ableness of the program.5 4 Determining the meaning of equality
requires a decision as to the appropriate standard for comparison.
Reasonableness requires attention both to the legitimate needs of
the institution and to the principle of equality of economic oppor-
tunity. Different considerations apply and different institutional
policies are arguably pertinent depending upon the nature of the
regulation applied and whether it is being applied to pregnancy,
delivery, or the post-delivery period.
A. MATERNITY LEAiVE
The easiest issue involves the common policy of requiring a
pregnant woman to take leave after a certain number of months
54 In Miller v. Industrial Commission, 480 P.2d 565 (Col. 1971), the Supreme Court
of Colorado rejected the argument that singling out pregnancy for special treatment
under the employment insurance law was a form of sex discrimination: "[Tihe act
treats men and women workers the same for purposes of eligibility and qualification for
unemployment benefits, . . . It is only where the woman worker has become pregnant
that she is treated differently, placed in a separate classification from other men and
women workers. Such a classification founded on the special consideration of pregnancy
cannot be said to be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional .... Such a classification
is not based upon sex alone ... which classification then might be subject to a valid
criticism of unreasonableness." Id. at 568.
The court distinguished between categories based on sex and categories based on sex in
combination with some other attribute. This distinction (the so-called "sex plus" doc-
trine) has been rejected in Title VII cases. Cohen v. Chesterfield, 4 FEP CASES 1237
(CA 4th, 1972). Both the EEOC and the courts have taken the position that when all or
substantially all of the people in a class singled out for special treatment are of one sex,
sex discrimination exists.
Guideline 1604.3 provides that it is "not ... relevant that the rule is not directed
against all females ... for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such
application involves discrimination based on sex."
As the Seventh Circuit stated in rejecting the contention that distinctions not phrased
in terms of sex do not constitute sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII, "The
effect of the statute is not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a
portion of the protected class. Discrimination is not to be tolerated under the guise of
physical properties possessed by one sex." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194 (7th Cir. 1971) aff'g 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Il1. 1970). In Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542 (1971), the Supreme Court, without discussion,
rejected the argument that categories based on sex plus some other factor cannot consti-
tute discrimination for the purposes of Title VII. There is little reason to suppose it will
adopt a different standard in construing the Fourteenth Amendment or the Equal Rights
Amendment.
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of pregnancy. Such regulations have been challenged in a number
of recent cases by women teachers who wished to remain on the
job." In each case the pregnant woman has introduced medical
evidence to support her contention that she was not physically dis-
abled in any way from performing her duties. The institution has
typically responded with evidence indicating that pregnant women
in general require assistance or that the rule eliminates administra-
tive problems which would be involved in making individual de-
terminations of disability. In one case a school system suggested
that pregnant teachers had been subject in the past to some minor
harassment by pupils. 6 The institution did not challenge medical
testimony indicating that the woman was medically capable of per-
forming her duties.
In some cases such rules have been affirmed without recognition
of the fact that sex discrimination was involved. Thus, in Cerra v.
East Stroudsburg Area School District,57 the court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a rule requiring the resignation of schoolteachers
after the fifth month of pregnancy. The court did not address itself
to the wisdom of the regulation nor did it consider whether the
regulation was discriminatory. It merely referred to testimony by
the Secretary of Education that the regulation "was a reasonable
one" and within the Board's authority. Most recent cases, however,
have recognized that the question is not solely whether the regula-
tion serves a legitimate purpose but also whether pregnant women
are being denied benefits available to men who have no greater
claim to them. In holding a forced maternity leave policy to be
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Circuit recently
stated: 's
Male teachers are not subject to pregnancy but they are sub-
ject to many types of illnesses and disabilities. This record
indicates clearly that pregnant women teachers have been
singled out for unconstitutionally unequal restrictions upon
their employment.
' See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 4 FEP CASES 1237 (CA 4th, 1972);
LaFleur v. Board of Education, 4 FEP CASES 1070 (CA Zth 1972); Schattman v. Texas
Employment Commission, 4 FEP CASES 353 (CA 5th, 1972); William v. San Francisco
Unified School District, 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Bravo v. Board of Education,
4 FEP CASES 995 (N.D. I11. 1972).
"See LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
reversed, 4 FEP CASES 107 (CA 6th, 1972).
57 285 A.2d 206 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1971).
53 LaFleur v. Board, note 55 supra, at 1073.
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The application of such rules to women capable of working is
inconsistent with the Court's decision in Reed v. Reed. The major
thrust of the Reed decision is that administrative convenience does
not justify treating women as a class and thereby ignoring the spe-
cific claims of individual women. Under a strict standard of review,
pregnant women should not be treated as a class and healthy preg-
nant women should not be treated differently from healthy men.
Moreover, equality cannot be obtained if the negative reactions of
others are grounds for continuing to disfavor the group previously
discriminated against.-"
Even under a more lenient standard, such regulations are prob-
ably invalid. Where teachers are concerned, the institution's interest
in preventing mishaps is offset by the desirability of maintaining
continuity in the educational experience of the pupils. Moreover,
forced maternity leave programs have a significant impact upon the
employment situation of the women affected by them. Where sub-
stantial periods of leave are involved, a teacher may be forced to
miss two semesters. In addition to the financial sacrifice, the wom-
an's professional development is halted. She does not accrue benefits
during this period, and she may not be able to return to the precise
position which she was forced to give up even if she is entitled to
return to work. Thus, as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently stated: 60
We need not concern ourselves with the applicable test to
discriminate validity on the basis of sex... because under
either we think the regulation denies equal protection. The
record is literally devoid of any reason medical or administra-
tive why a pregnant teacher must accept an enforced leave by
the end of the fifth month of pregnancy if she and her doctor
conclude that she can perform her duties beyond that date.
There are many possible issues concerning pregnancy and
childbirth which pose more complicated questions. Some of these
are discussed below. The preliminary discussion assumes that these
59 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Diaz v. Pan American Wbrld Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (CA 5th, 1971).
60 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, note 54 supra, at 1239. One way in
which pregnancy-related leave might be treated differently from other forms of temporary
disability is in requiring advance notice of the employee's decision to stop work at a
certain point in the pregnancy if she does not desire to work as long as is medically
possible.
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issues will be treated as constitutional questions. It would in general
be more desirable to handle these problems under currently ap-
plicable statutes.
B. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO WORK
In some cases so much time off will either be required or volun-
tarily sought that under established sick leave or disability standards
the woman would not be automatically entitled to return to work.
In such cases pregnant women would not be treated differently
from employees in comparable leave situations. Moreover, such
policies serve legitimate institutional interests in continuity of em-
ployment. A rational argument can be made, however, to support
special constitutional protection for pregnant women.61
Childbirth has a unique social value not possessed by other hu-
man behavior. A great percentage of women become pregnant at
an early and crucial state of their professional development. If
women are forced to choose between motherhood and career, the
goal of economic equality cannot be achieved. Even if those termi-
nated returned to the work force, denial of the right to return to
the job held before pregnancy would prevent them from developing
seniority rights for promotion and accruing fringe benefits. The
Court might compromise by holding that a constitutional right to
return to work after pregnancy exists, limited to the time of medical
disability. 2
C. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH BENEFITS
Normally illness and disability are compensated by health insur-
ance and paid sick leave which is accrued by seniority. With respect
to insurance benefits, current programs might exclude medical ex-
'1 Comment, Love's Labor's Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leave, 7 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 260, 268 (1972); Developments-Title VII, at 1170.
62 If a woman takes off more time than is medically necessary, she would be treated
as are other people who take leave for personal reasons. Such a rule would be extremely
difficult to operate effectively. Fine questions about the meaning of medical necessity
would inevitably arise, and there would be little guidance available to school administra-
tors in deciding the category in which a particular employee fell. Moreover, such a rule
would fail to recognize the important psychological need which may exist for a family
to adjust to a new life. It would be administratively simpler and more responsive to the
interests involved for the Court to require that in addition to the woman's being able to
take off the time medically required, either parent should be permitted leave for a reason-
able time after birth without risking his or her job.
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penses connected with childbirth on the theory that pregnancy is a
voluntarily acquired condition. In addition, most policies do not
provide benefits for conditions which predate the time of hire or
else have a one-year waiting period for maternity benefits. The
denial of insurance benefits on the grounds that pregnancy is volun-
tary should not be permitted.63 Pregnancy is unlike other voluntary
disability requiring medical care because it is socially useful. On the
other hand, the requirement of a waiting period makes sense as a
way of preventing women from seeking a job primarily as the means
of financing the cost of delivery of their children. In this case, the
reasons for the general policy apply to pregnancy as well.
D. UNWED MATERNITY
Some schools treat unwed maternity as grounds for expulsion or
other sanctions.6 4 Such policies are obviously discriminatory unless
they are made applicable to unwed fathers as well. Even where such
rules are theoretically applicable to both men and women, often
only the mother will be affected because only she will be identified.
Since it is difficult to defend such rules in terms of legitimate insti-
tutional concerns, their validity should not be upheld unless it can
be shown that in practice they are applied to both men and women.05
E. PREGNANCY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
An institution seeking to increase the number of its women em-
ployees or students might permit pregnant women to work part
time or carry a reduced course load and provide special insurance
benefits or leave with pay.
It is arguable that such programs deny equal protection of the
laws to men. The argument should be rejected. As the discussion
above indicates, the concept of equality cannot be applied with
precision in cases involving questions of pregnancy. Moreover,
63 Id. at 283 et seq.
" Some schools penalize students who become mothers by keeping them from extra-
curricular activities. In such cases the program would be discriminatory unless a similar
program was in existence for men students who became unwed fathers. Recent cases
have held that unwed mothers may not be barred from high school. Ordway v. Har-
graves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); Shull v. Columbus Municipal School
District, 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
65 Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital, 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kans. 1971); Dec. No. 71-562,
1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 6184 (EEOC) (4 December 1970).
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even with special benefits, there will be some educational or pro-
fessional costs involved for the woman and for her family. The most
that any economically and politically feasible affirmative action pro-
gram could do is minimize the cost.
Sexual equality would, however, require that any program of
leave after the birth of a child apart from that required for delivery
should be available to men and to women equally.6 6 It should be for
the parents to decide which of them will take leave to care for the
child. Limiting such leaves to women would mean that the profes-
sional careers of women but not of men would be interrupted if the
parents decide that a newborn child should have close parental at-
tention during infancy.
F. THE AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION
Constitutional litigation does not seem the best way to resolve
the conflicting interests of educational institutions and pregnant
women. The delicate interest-balancing engaged in above is highly
theoretical and based in part on conjecture. The practical and finan-
cial implications involved in many of the positions argued for can-
not be understood until they are tried. It is important that the law
change as practical experience reveals problems and issues not now
clearly perceived. Currently, either Title VII, Executive Order
11,246 as amended by 11,375, or the Equal Educational Opportuni-
ties Act, and state law cover all the questions raised. The agencies
which enforce these statutes and regulations are in a position to
develop rules and guidelines as experience shows them to be neces-
sary and feasible. Accordingly, it would make sense for the courts
to deal with these questions to the extent possible as matters of
statutory construction. The courts should give great weight to ad-
ministrative determination so as not to foreclose questions under the
statute prematurely. The Constitution should be invoked only
where statutes do not provide a remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principle of sexual equality does not require that sex al-
ways be treated as an invalid consideration. 7 Indeed, in certain cir-
" Danielson v. Board of Higher Education, 4 FEP CASES 885 (S.D. N.Y 1972).
17 Athletic programs are another area in which equality may require recognition of
sex. There are currently far more male students than females involved in sports. Certain
cumstances achieving equality requires specific awareness of sex. The
next decade will involve the courts in the difficult task of enunciat-
ing the circumstances under which recognition of sex can coexist
with the Equal Rights Amendment or with the concept of sexual
equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Sure answers
are likely to be as elusive here as they have proved to be in race cases.
sports such as football, basketball, and baseball are almost entirely masculine enterprises.
These are the top priority sports involving the greatest expenditure of money and the
active interest of other students and the outside community. Participation by girls is
limited to being cheerleaders, pompom girls, or drum majorettes, all of which are sub-
ordinate positions emphasizing attractiveness rather than athletic skills.
Some progress can be made by opening up existing programs to women. However,
the removal of formal barriers is likely to have only a limited effect. Current differ-
ences between the sexes make it unlikely than many women would enter into existing
athletic programs, and most would be at a competitive disadvantage. Affirmative action
is necessary if women are to participate equally in athletics. This would require in most
schools establishing or substantially strengthening women's athletic programs and
focusing on areas not currently emphasized in women's intra- or extramural athletics.
The measure of equality for athletic programs should be the number of women participat-
ing, the amount of money spent by the system, and the availability of resources. These,
rather than technical eligibility under existing programs or whether male and female
programs concentrate on the same areas, should determine whether a school system is
complying with the Fourteenth Amendment or the Equal Rights Amendment.
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